call upon the king's support? The translation was intended to wrest a certain amount of judicial authority from Jewish courts, but this process had been occurring in Metz for some time, as we will see below.
2 It is thus perplexing as to why it was in the 1740s that the parlement decided to issue this particular appeal.
In order to understand the circumstances in which the translation was produced, we must examine what was occurring both in the Jewish community of Metz and the French polity at large. In each case, the situation was characterized by instability and dissatisfaction with the status quo. Jews began to feel confined by their court system, favoring rulings granted by French civil courts, while parlements for their part manifested a greater readiness to mount opposition to the monarchy, to exercise local liberties and secure independent legislative power. 3 This assertion of local privileges grew in response to the perceived infringement of royal power upon entrenched local governing bodies. The ongoing struggle between the monarchy and the Metz parlement, combined with the growing discontentment of Jews with the outcomes of their own legal system, ushered in a period of upheaval for parliamentary and Jewish community leaders alike, one in which Jewish juridical authority would be called into question and Jewish law laid bare for the consumption of secular authorities. A power struggle arose in which the sovereign power of the king would be invoked by the Jewish community, in a complex encounter of as yet uncodified and contested sovereignties.
PARLEMENTS AND THE MONARCHY IN THE ANCIEN RÉ GIME
Prior to the advent of enlightened absolutism, France had been governed in large part by local custom. Disparate regions practiced their own distinct customs, transmitted through oral tradition. 4 Legal variations between districts within pays de coutumes (regions that adhered to customary/ local law) revealed extensive localized customs, the territorial limits of which were often ambiguous. 5 As only the residents of local communities enjoyed such a keen and intricate understanding of their laws and customs, representatives from these localities were often called upon to compile legal codes for the monarchy, which endeavored to combat this fragmentation. Interestingly-and perhaps almost paradoxically-royal reliance on locals to document customary law reinforced local autonomy by implicitly acknowledging that only local inhabitants possessed the requisite knowledge to produce such works. 6 This was an unintended consequence that extended beyond the initial aims of the request.
Eventually, however, the crown abandoned this venture to turn to larger state affairs, and the decision was made that local customs should be published before representative assemblies in each district. 7 While this did not entirely terminate the king's involvement in the project, the central administration displayed a growing indifference, provided that its own authority was not called into question in local disputes. 8 Under the guidance of local assemblies, nearly all of the customs of the pays de coutumes had been published by 1582, and through the seventeenth and mideighteenth centuries, French rule in the provinces was structured around these local codes.
9 By the mid-eighteenth century, however, European polities had again begun to gravitate toward more centralized state structures.
The parlements of France had been virtually silent for the last forty years of the reign of Louis XIV, when Louis XV ascended the throne (1715).
10 By the mid-eighteenth century, though, the parlements had begun to lay claim to represent the principle of national sovereignty to give voice to the nation. 11 The reign of Louis XIV left little room for the parlements, as ''the parlements were strong only when the monarchy was weak. '' 12 During the reign of Louis XV and the regency of Phillip of Orleans, by contrast, a prolonged conflict between the crown and the parlements erupted which would culminate only with the Revolution.
While the parlements had already begun to resist royal authority when Louis XV ascended the throne, he nonetheless reestablished twelve pro-6. Ibid., 772. 7. Ibid. Throughout this essay, I use ''the king,'' ''the monarch,'' or ''the crown'' to refer to the authorities and officials who executed royal jurisdiction. In many cases, the king himself probably had no direct involvement with the many arrets issued in his name.
8. See Dawson, ''The Codification of the French Customs,'' 772, n. 30, for an expanded discussion of this point.
9. Ibid., 796. 10. Egret, Louis XV, 10. 11. Timothy Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory: Europe, 1648 -1815 (London, 2007 vincial parlements in cities throughout France, including one in Metz. 13 These parlements functioned in the judicial realm as local law courts, but they also exercised policing powers to benefit the king, creating tension with the royally appointed intendants, whose roles often overlapped.
14 Significantly in the eighteenth century, the parlements bore responsibility for registering royal decrees within their own jurisdiction (ressort). 15 The king would deliver his legislative edicts and arrets to the parlements, which would in turn execute them and occasionally change them if they conflicted with existing jurisprudence. This right to edit made it difficult to locate the balance of power between these two bodies. 16 Understanding well that local custom was a powerful force in these provincial areas (pays d'état) , the intendants, administrators sent from the ''center'' of France, were careful to base their actions on a fusion of sovereign will and respect for local institutions. 17 Louis XV was often left frustrated by the parlements and attempted to curtail their authority through disciplinary edicts that would frequently result in cessation of the legal system within their jurisdiction; however, he recognized the need to maintain a relationship with them. 18 Instead of issuing direct orders as arrets du conseil, Louis XV more frequently submitted laws to the parlements first, believing that this infused his decrees with the authority and gravity that they would otherwise have lacked, thereby encouraging local reception.
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Yet as the process of state centralization gained pace, the provincial parlements came to pose an ever greater threat to the consolidation of authority within the monarchy. In the emerging political discourse of state formation, local governance and corporate interests were to be subsumed under the greater interests of the state. Parlements, relics of the medieval French constitution, presented an obstacle to the spirit of 13. Egret, Louis XV, 43. The twelve provincial parlements were situated in Paris, Toulouse, Grenoble, Bordeaux, Dijon, Rouen, Aix, Rennes, Pau, Metz, Douai, and Besançon (Egret, Louis XV, 10, n. 4). It is not clear why the monarchy reestablished these provincial parlements, given the challenges they frequently presented to royal authority.
14. For a detailed treatment of the intendants, see Vivian R. Gruder, The Royal Provincial Intendants: A Governing Elite in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca, N.Y., 1968 enlightened reform that the monarchy wished to exemplify. Desiring a share in the lawmaking power in addition to the retention of judicial functions, parlements impeded reform wherever they could. 20 In order to push forward state centralization, Louis XV had to both appease local governing bodies and contend with their growing assertion of local autonomy engendered by an expanding conception of local rights and traditions. In their turn, the parlements invoked historic customs and traditional practices to legitimate themselves as the building blocks of the nation. Though they acknowledged the divine right of monarchy, they maintained that France had always been a constitutional monarchy, and they conceived of themselves as the intermediaries between the king and the people.
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Even as late as 1724, a well-known scholar of Roman law wrote regarding local disputes, ''It is not our practice to consult the king concerning all the private controversies that present difficulties . . . in these matters the authority of the Parlement and of all the judges is supreme . . . from the Parlement no one can appeal, not even to the king. '' 22 It was in this context that the episode of the translation must be placed.
THE JEWS OF METZ IN THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
In the early part of the eighteenth century, the Ashkenazic Jewish community of Metz, like other European Jewish communities, maintained an internal court system which adjudicated civil disputes between community members.
23 From the late sixteenth century when Metz came under French rule, communal ordinances were issued by a council consisting of lay syndics (officials; parnasim, in Hebrew) and the chief rabbi of the city. Elected by the richest taxpayers of the community, the syndics collected taxes and served as liaisons between the Jewish community and both the local and royal authorities. Disputes between community members were arbitrated by a tribunal of elected officials headed by the chief rabbi, which could exact penalties ranging from small fines to the powerful h . erem (excommunication). The h . erem was in many ways the focal point of communal authority. Through its execution, Jewish courts possessed the power to affect the lives of their constituents in the most severe way: not only could the h . erem remove banned individuals from the city but it could require members of the community to exclude them from communal activities of every variety.
25
Already by the mid-seventeenth century, however, the parlement had attempted to restrict Jewish judicial power. In 1634, it declared the right to adjudicate between Jews in cases that did not involve ''matters of religion or internal police,'' a turn of phrase that would appear in later documents discussing the limits of Jewish judicial authority.
26 ''Internal police'' likely referred to civil disputes, while ''matters of religion'' concerned questions of religious practice. It is doubtful that Jews followed this restriction, as internal community sources point to the prioritization of a strong court system at least through the beginning of the eighteenth century, if not later.
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In 1709, the communal register (pinkas ha-kahal) of Metz documented the appointment of Rabbi Avraham Broda of Prague as the chief rabbi and head of court (av bet din) of the town, containing the usual rhetoric of a rabbinic contract:
To be for us and for our community and for all [communities] 27. While there were examples of Jews using non-Jewish courts in Metz before the eighteenth century, documentation of these cases increased in the eighteenth century.
the Torah, laws, and statutes.
28 Strength and the government (memshalah) should be with him to subjugate the eager nation and to teach them the path of the righteous on which they should go.
29
The leaders of the community believed that the government would support Jewish courts, though it is unclear whether the Hebrew word for government (memshalah) was intended to refer to the king or to the parlement.
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Though lay leaders may have revered the authority of the av bet din, by 1709 constituents had already started to seek rulings outside of the domain of Jewish courts. In her memoir from 1715, the businesswoman Glikl of Hameln wrote nostalgically of the days of yore in Metz, when no person would dare step outside the bounds of the Jewish community to bring a case before a gentile tribunal. ''When differences arose from time to time, as is customary among Jews,'' she wrote, ''everything was settled quietly with the community or the judges. There was no such arrogance in the old days as there is now . . . [the community] time and again appointed the most eminent rabbis to serve the community. '' 31 While this likely reflects more nostalgia than reality, nonetheless, an ordinance (takanah) from the community in 1710, too, reminisced about the strength of the community in the past, when all individuals respected the authority of Jewish courts. It lamented the rise of dissidents in recent times, who had breached the law (porets geder) in seeking the decisions of secular courts. 32 The ruling berated anyone who sought recourse to secular courts or encouraged another to do so:
[They] will be cursed and damned, and all of the curses and oaths written in the book of the Torah will hang over them, and there will not be a remedy for this-it is a curse from the rabbis that does not have a remedy except for shame and embarrassment, and it will be decreed and publicized and they will be shamed and disgraced.
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The takanah further required that dissidents be excluded from the communal mi-sheberakh blessing in the Sabbath prayers. Interestingly, while the ruling initially described the actions of these individuals in a legal context, the end of the ordinance appeals to the dissident's sense of morality, saying, ''He shall sanctify himself in what is permitted to him and distance himself from that which is ugly and the like. '' 34 The ordinance thus suggested that appealing one's cases to secular court was not legally prohibited but rather defied what was moral and constituted ''that which is ugly.'' Perhaps this extralegal consideration gave Jews more reason to appeal to secular courts: if it was not formally prohibited by Jewish law, then what could, in reality, stop Jews from attending them? This ordinance, it should be noted, applied only to cases between Jews, as Jews who conducted business with Christians would have routinely come in front of French courts. Additionally, the takanah would only have mattered to those individuals who cared what the community thought. Those who stepped outside the bounds of communal jurisdiction implied that they did not, so a censure or moral imperative may have been less powerful.
This ordinance nevertheless bears witness to the value that syndics placed on Jewish courts in early eighteenth-century Metz. Considering themselves inheritors of a divine tradition, communal leaders attempted to promote the continuity of these institutions against the pressures brought by royal and parliamentary officials. In October of the same year in which Broda arrived in Metz, the royal procurator (procureur) complained to the officers of the bailiwick regarding the establishment of a Jewish tribunal in Metz. The procureur attempted to reaffirm the 1634 ruling that Jewish courts could only judge matters of religion and internal police, criticizing the Jews for disobeying this arret. societal acts amongst themselves without any formalities, [written] with Hebrew characters in the Hebrew language,'' he explained. ''The conditions [of these acts] frequently become ruinous to the other subjects of the king, as all of their practices intend only to establish amongst themselves a sovereign and despotic authority which disrupts the order of the kingdom. '' 35 This was precisely the kind of case made in order to codify, systematize, and standardize, and to abolish the special privileges that could hinder the creation of a unified, cohesive state. As with the parlements, special privileges that had been granted to the Jewish nation within France now clashed with the agenda of the absolutist state.
Broda responded in January 1710 by explaining the necessity of a Jewish court system, arguing that ''this [Jewish] law giving them judges and containing, on all matters, decisions different from those given by civil law . . . only the rabbis who have studied this [law] extensively from their early years are educated in it.'' He further defended this right through the historical precedent of French kings who had allowed Jews to adjudicate ''since time immemorial. '' 36 Despite recent declines in Jewish authority, the procureur and the officers of the parlement clearly saw Broda's arrival as a menacing assertion of sovereign Jewish power. Soon after, in August 1710, the king issued a declaration requiring the Jews of Metz to record their communal registers in French, an act that parlement would verify less than a month later.
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This was perhaps a joint effort to ensure that the Jewish community could hide nothing from French officials by writing documents in Hebrew. It was undoubtedly difficult for French officials to demarcate clear lines between competing sovereignties: while, on the one hand, the king and the parlement accepted the need for the Jewish community to maintain its own documentation, on the other hand, the king required registers in French in order to maintain control over the Jews.
In 1718, the king seized control of the power to choose the rabbi for the Jews of Metz. Jewish leaders protested this royal invasion into communal life, noting that while some individuals of the Jewish nation had tried to weaken the authority of the rabbi by contravening the intentions of the king, ''this should not cause the community to lose the protection of the monarchy.'' They implored the king to allow them to keep the rabbi that they had elected, in the same capacity as in the past. 38 instance may appear to be merely a continuation of the process that began earlier, it is significant that in 1718 the Jews of Metz turned only to the king-not to the parlement and the king-for support. It was the monarch who was responsible for ensuring the status of the Jews, and it was he whom the Jews perceived as the authoritative voice of the French state.
As the parlements and the king themselves struggled for power, the question of Jewish juridical authority in Metz became a battle ground for these two players, in which legal contests, disputes, and appeals brought to light the question of where sovereignty lay in eighteenth-century France.
* * * The Jews of Metz were by no means unaware of the tense relationship between the king and their parlement. While lettres patentes from the king consistently reaffirmed the juridical autonomy and authority of the Jewish community, the parlement repeatedly tried to derail this power and wrest authority from the Jews. Because the king had upheld the autonomy of Jewish courts, the parlement's defiance of the judicial rulings of those very courts represented an affront to the authority of the monarch. Ironically, though, both the parlement and the Jewish community appealed to the king as a means of securing their own sovereignty, even when in practice their powers might challenge those of the king. In the case of the lettres patentes, ambiguity allowed the parlement to reinterpret these statutes as it saw fit, imposing harsher rulings between more broadly defined legislative acts from the crown. The Jewish community often turned to the crown for protection.
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In a supplication from ''les juifs de Metz'' dated after 1728, for example, the Jews complained to the king about the religious conversion of young Jewish children to Christianity. They explained that prior to the age of puberty, a child did not possess the free will and sensibility to make such decisions, and they requested that the king declare it illegal to ''remove children of this religion or to induce them to change religion before the age of fourteen for males and twelve for females.'' 40 When explaining the reasons why they approached the king to handle this matter, the Jews recalled the ordinance which the king presented to the Jews of Bordeaux on July 15, 1728, in order to facilitate the return of a certain Alexandre Mezes's three daughters from an Ursuline convent in the city. The ordinance in Bordeaux, according to their description, prohibited any superiors, convents, or communities from receiving Jewish children under the pretext of religion before the age of twelve.
Having witnessed the authority the king exhibited in his dealings in other cities, the Jews sought recourse to the throne for protection-not to the parlement. They explained:
After the ordinance granted by Your Majesty in favor of the Jews of Bordeaux, it is useless to search for other authorities to establish the demand of the Jews of Metz. The reasons which determined Your Majesty to make this order are the same that the supplicants employ to obtain a similar [ordinance] in their favor.
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The sweeping powers of the monarchy, extending beyond the limited jurisdiction of local authorities, caused the Jews to reach beyond Metz for support. It was the king, and not the parlement, who possessed the requisite authority to make such a decree. Clearly aware of a dichotomy between parliamentary and royal authority, the Jews sought to manipulate this distinction to gain the support of the king, using a precedent from beyond the jurisdiction of the parlement to prove their point.
An example of this occurred again in 1734 under similar circumstances. The Jews complained that a certain young girl, Ester Salomon, from the neighboring community of Norbach (presently called Forbach), had been placed in the home of an abusive uncle following the death of her parents. 42 After the girl fled to the home of her uncle's neighbor to escape maltreatment, the uncle demanded that she return to his home immediately. An officer of the town, understanding the harsh situation from which Salomon had escaped, instructed the neighbor to keep the girl under her supervision. Shortly after, the neighbor placed Salomon into a convent.
Though this time the Jews registered their complaint with the bishopric of Metz, a local authority, they still defined themselves as ''subjects of 41. Ibid. 42 . From this and other documents, it is clear that the Jewish courts of Metz served as the central authority for many other communities in the area, drawing members from the communities of Norbach, Ventoul, Thionville, and even, occasionally, communities in Alsace. Likewise, the Metz parlement frequently heard non-Jewish cases from other towns, serving as the central authority for these locations. See, e.g., A. the king, and consequently under his protection.'' The king's approval, they believed, obligated the authorities of Metz to respect their establishments as required by order of the state. They reasserted their demand that prior to the age of twelve, no Jewish child be forcibly converted or placed under Christian authority, again citing the royal order given to the Jews of Bordeaux.
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The Jewish leaders of Metz understood the king's protection to be a legitimating force through which they could justify their own judicial authority over their community. Though they realized the limitations of communal governance, support from the king bolstered and extended their claims. In numerous cases, Jewish leaders appealed beyond local authorities, unambiguously locating the monarch as the sovereign power of France. They recognized that the rulings of the parlement bore little influence in the face of intervention from the monarch, and that within the framework of a centralized state, the parlement was but one, subsidiary element.
The Metz parlement, too, began to recognize the power of royal endorsement, much to its dismay. While provincial parlements throughout France engaged the monarchy in a decades-long battle over Jansenism and national sovereignty, the Metz parlement recognized the legitimacy that royal authorization could equally lend to its rulings, ultimately choosing to capitulate to royal authority in order to more effectively execute its own agenda. As this process occurred in Metz, the Jewish community became a focus around which these questions of authority converged.
UPHEAVAL FROM WITHIN
Tensions between the Jewish community and the Metz parlement began to intensify in the 1740s. Many individual members of the Jewish community, dissatisfied with the rulings of local Jewish courts, were already clamoring for the support of parlement and seeking recourse to the secular courts of the province. 44 The parlement, in turn, wishing to solidify its own power in the face of royal opposition, gladly received the cases of Jews 43. CAHJP F Me 46, Petition a l'eveque de Metz contre la conversion d'une fillette juive, 1734. At the end of the petition, the Jews requested that the bishop order the removal of Ester Salomon from the convent. This idea of providing a guardian for a minor was of central importance to both the civil and Jewish courts of France. Some of the cases that came to the Jewish courts will be discussed below. who chose to opt out of the Jewish court system. Two such cases, however, tipped the scales of parliamentary interference in Jewish affairs and more aggressively called into question the juridical autonomy of the Jewish nation. The content of these specific cases was in many ways similar to that of those which had appeared previously-contestations of excommunications, claims of property rights, and disputes over inheritances. Yet in a novel turn of events, the defendants in these two instances were both women, pointing to a new development both in French legal history and in the history of the Jewish community of Metz.
Though this unofficial initiation of women into the litigation system gave them a significant hand in challenging the existing framework of adjudication, the contentions of these women alone were not enough to encourage such a proactive response from the parlement. 45 Equally important in the parlement's decision to request a translation of Jewish law from the community in Metz was its own struggle to assert provincial authority. While previous lawsuits contesting the rulings of Jewish courts had been handled on an individual basis, mounting tension between state and local sovereignty encouraged the Metz parlement to view the cases of these two women, Merlé and Magdeleine, as opportunities to justify a restructuring of legal boundaries. It was only at this moment, when these factors aligned, that the parlement took a definitive step to secure its own authority, in turn diminishing that of the Jews.
THE CASE OF MERLÉ (SPIR LÉ VI) WORMS
On December 2, 1739, the will of a deceased woman by the name of Merlé was registered by the lieutenant general of the bailiwick tribunal of Metz. Merlé's will, quite shockingly, dispossessed her husband and removed their children from his custody. 46 Furious, her husband, Joseph Worms, claimed that this was without juridical precedence and therefore void. Merlé's will stated that since her husband had used her dowry money and the assets she had received from her father, she reserved the right to separate the remainder of her property from her husband. 47 Worms decried the ''injustice'' of this action, citing talmudic and rabbinic sources that forbade Jewish women from creating a will and gave husbands the right to inherit the estates of their wives. These restrictions 45 . The significance of gender in these appeals to the parlement merits further inquiry.
46. Malino, ''Résistances et révoltes,'' 126. 47. Ibid., 127. Merlé's family, the Spir Lévi family, was one of the richest in Metz. Merlé had apparently wanted to leave her husband for a long time, but her father had convinced her to stay with him. stood in contrast to French civil society under the ancien régime, where, despite legal and political theorists' ideological rejection of women's autonomy, curatorship over their children's inheritance and the inviolability of contracts imparted a certain de facto autonomy to women. 48 Nonetheless, according to Jewish law, Worms's objection was valid. Relying on the codes of Maimonides and R. Joseph Karo, Worms stated that ''the man inherits the estate of his wife, whether dowry, patrimonial, or casuals, preferably [given] to their children, '' 49 further alleging that the only reason Merlé had been allowed to compose a will containing such terms, without disputation by communal authorities, was because her brother, Olry Spir Lévi, played a prominent role in Jewish life in Metz as a syndic and had purportedly instructed the rabbi of the community not to meddle in the affairs of his family. 50 Apparently, he had wished for some time that his sister would separate from Worms and sought to aid her in this matter even after her death. This allowed his personal vendetta to interfere with local politics.
Olry Spir Lévi's manipulative influence over the rabbi and communal leaders of Metz, and the willingness with which Worms shared this problem with parliamentary authorities, illustrates the growing problem of a wealthy individual's influence on the Jewish community. While questions of irregular political influence on the law had no doubt surfaced before, members of the Jewish community had not been as quick to turn to secular authority to defend Jewish legal principles. Defying the assumed boundaries between Jewish and secular law, Worms appealed to the parlement to protect the interests reserved for him by Jewish law.
Recent scholarship shows that this sort of recourse was happening increasingly across Europe during this time. David Horowitz has demonstrated how Jews living in Hamburg, Germany, around the same time attempted to challenge the decisions of the rabbinic court and attack its constitutional legitimacy by complaining to the Hamburg senate. Jews often claimed that the rabbinic court was abusing its power, prompting the secular government to intervene and force the court to reverse its decisions. 51 Others have shown how this experience was manifest in Central Europe.
52 Metz was no different in this regard, where individual Jews increasingly sought the support of the parlement in the effort to challenge communal jurisdiction.
Though unfamiliar with Jewish laws and traditions, the parlement upheld the need to judge the Jews according to Jewish law. Like Jewish community members who realized the effectiveness of obtaining parliamentary support to protect their rights, the parlement recognized the need to appeal to Jewish law to assert its own interests. Invoking a position taken by Worms, who had sought secular means to establish his Jewish rights, here, the parlement used religious law to confirm its own rights. Until now, it had relied on information from Jewish defendants who cited passages from the legal codes of Maimonides and Karo, but the parlement had no definitive, interpretable code with which to work. The parlement's eventual demand for a translation from the Jews of Metz was intended to mirror previous attempts. 53 Additionally, other corporate communities within the region had produced compendia of local customs to which the parlement referred when adjudicating cases involving Jews; still the Jews of Metz had yet to generate a similar work. 54 In order for the parlement to be considered an authority, it needed to produce its own source. 54. It seems that the parlement used examples of other local customs to justify what it thought would be the law for the Jews, comparing Christian laws and those of the Evêché to that stated by defendants to be the law according to Juda-Resolved at once to limit the juridical autonomy given to the Jews of Metz in the 1718 lettres patentes and to have a document of reference by which to fairly judge Jewish cases in parliamentary courts, on August 29, 1740, the parlement requested a compendium of Jewish customs and practices, translated into French.
55 At this time the community was still under the rabbinic leadership of R. Joshua Falk, who deferred the demands of the parlement until his departure the following year. 56 In the interim between Falk's departure and the arrival of R. Jonathan Eybeschutz, community leaders excused their tardiness by explaining that they were waiting for a rabbi to assist them in producing the translation. Though Eybeschutz arrived prior to Passover of 1742, the community did nothing until the summer, when the parlement revisited the order and-through the involvement of the king-reminded the Jewish community of the obligation which it had neglected.
THE CASE OF MAGDELEINE CAHEN
The Archives Départementales in Metz contains dozens of manuscripts that discuss the case of Magdeleine Cahen, the fiancée of Bernard Cahen. Prior to her marriage, Cahen requested that 3,600 livres from her dowry and thirty ounces of silver dishes that her father had left her in a notary document from 1731 be excluded from her marital property. 58 The syndics of the community, one of whom was her guardian, Isaac Cahen, tried to convince her to accept a reduced dowry, but she refused. excommunicated by the syndics, perhaps to temper disputes and thereby divert attention from the internal problems of the community, Cahen appealed to the bailiwick and then presented her case to the parlement.
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Intending to appeal her excommunication, Cahen complained that her status as an excommunicated person rendered any decisions of the bailiwick impossible to apply to the Jewish community. The syndics, in turn, denied having excommunicated her, claiming that she was delusional and thus not to be believed. Yet the parlement eventually confirmed Cahen's excommunication and instructed the community-at the request of Cahen herself-to overturn the decree in the synagogue by stating that she had not been excommunicated and that all Jews should help her to ensure that the decision was properly executed.
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Magdeleine Cahen's case not only challenged Jewish law but also called into question the authority of the syndics.
62 Though the syndics acted indifferently on the issue of Cahen's dowry, it is clear that it would have benefited at least one of them to present her with a reduced sum; furthermore, while they denied the excommunication, this must surely have been the impetus for Cahen to take her case to a non-Jewish court. The syndics had tried to mask internal strife, but by trying to silence Cahen's dissent, they had effectively encouraged her to seek support elsewhere. This instance, to the parlement, may have served as proof of the need to limit the judicial powers of the Jewish community in order to protect the rights of individual Jews.
Cahen's case occurred in June 1742, with some of the documentation extending into the month of July. 63 The king issued his lettres patentes, placing a royal stamp upon the request for a recueil, shortly after in midAugust. 64 The parlement had now recognized that it could use the authority of the king to bolster its position.
60. Berkovitz, Protocols of Justice, has noted that cases involving womenprimarily widows-who sought to collect the assets recorded in their ketubot (marriage contracts) were some of the most common to appear before the bet din from 1771 onward. Though Cahen was engaged and not yet married, her dispute bears similarity to many of these later cases.
61. David Horowitz, ''Fractures,'' 154-55, records a similar case in Hamburg in 1766, in which a certain Moses Joseph, excommunicated by the chief rabbi of the community and subsequently by the Jewish (lay) council, submitted a petition to the municipal government of Hamburg to protest this alleged abuse of power.
62 As we have already seen, a letter dated July 30, 1742, and addressed to Monsieur de Montholon, procureur of the parlement of Metz, advised the official to expedite the translation by seeking royal lettres patentes. Though further correspondence between the procureur and the king regarding this matter remains undiscovered, the king issued his lettres patentes on August 20, 1742. The lettres patentes began by noting the privileges that the king had bestowed upon the community in 1718 (requiring them to come before the civil courts for matters involving Christians but yielding judicial authority to the rabbis to adjudicate cases between Jews in Jewish courts). The document went on to discuss how things had changed since the dispute between Joseph Worms and Bernard Spir Lévi. The lettres patentes explained that as a result of Merlé's case, ''you [the Jewish community] were ordered, that by the chiefs, elected officials, and syndics of the community of Jews, there should be a compendium in the French language of laws, customs, and usages that they observe. '' 65 This would consist of laws concerning marriage contracts, guardianships, minors, wills, and other civil matters.
The king required that the community produce a recueil ''in the time and space of six months. '' 66 During this span, Eybeschutz arrived in Metz and along with community officials assumed this task, taking meticulous care to rely strictly on the customs of Metz and employing a lawyer to assist in the translation. 67 But the parlement was dissatisfied with the final product, finding the translation to be convoluted, inexact, and meandering, and hired a distinguished legal consult by the name of Nicholas Lançon to abridge and amend the work. 68 Lançon had previously worked on a compendium of the customs of the nearby city of Verdun, making him an authority on this matter.
While the Jewish community ultimately complied with the requests of the king and the parlement, communal leaders unquestionably viewed this process as an affront and repeatedly sought to defend the principles on which Jewish juridical autonomy in Metz rested.
Cahen reinforced the need in the eyes of the parlement for a translation of Jewish law to be available for reference. What is more, it may have illustrated to the parlement the necessity of involving the monarch in order to support this demand with more authority. In the same passage, he implicitly accused the Jews of Metz of shirking Torah law, asking, ''For is the law of the king preferable to the law of the King of the Universe?'' Considering his fervor on this matter, Eybeschutz may have agreed to initiate the parlement into the world of Jewish law because he did not have a choice. Though we cannot be certain, it is plausible that Eybeschutz simply opposed civic disobedience and therefore did not feel that he should rebel against the decision of the parlement and the king. Within the community he could condemn going to nonJewish courts, but he could not publicly condemn the translation. He may have concluded that if recourse to secular courts could not be prevented, this was the best possible option.
The syndics were not so eager to please. Though they complied with the official request of the parlement in 1742, they expended much energy during the following years advocating for juridical autonomy in the form of supplications and letters to the parlement and the king. Overlooked in historical work on Metz, these supplications convey the urgent worry that plagued leaders of the community during this time.
72 Though community members had already breached the boundaries between secular and religious, the syndics guarded their jurisdiction by reassuring the parlement of the necessity for Jewish self-governance.
Many of these supplications and letters appear to have been delivered along with the recueil itself. One such document presented the recueil to Monsieur le Chancellier of the parlement, ''with the effect of ascribing the necessary authority to the said customs and laws,'' and then went on to defend the right of the rabbis and leaders of the community. The first chapter of the compendium, the writers explained, concerned the jurisdiction of the rabbis, lay leaders, and elected officials, but this section was not of interest to anyone outside of the Jewish community.
73 This qualifying remark constituted an attempt to deflect the gaze of the parlement, playing down the significance of the recueil by asserting that autonomy was a fundamental principle of the laws. The document explained that if the rabbis and leaders of the community were left without jurisdiction, insurgents would slander them and form factions. The communal leaders, furthermore, hold the place of the ancient judges of Israel under the orders and protection of the monarchs, to ensure the observance of ceremonial as well as moral laws which constitute the distribution of justice between them, conforming to the precepts set out in the books of Moses and other [books] of law, written following the interpretations of the Talmud and which they call ''oral law'' or tradition . . . It is a part of their religion and their police [administration] , one that has always been recognized above all in Metz. 74 As in earlier times, the communal leaders of Metz appealed to Christian officials invoking ancient biblical practice, talmudic interpretation, and oral tradition. 75 The letter continued at length to attempt to demonstrate the historical precedent for this autonomous communal structure in Metz. From the defensive character of the prose, it is evident that to the leaders of the community, the recueil posed a threat to existing structures of Jewish jurisdiction. At the same time, they had conceded to the king's protection.
Related documents from this time follow a similar pattern-communal leaders claimed historical precedent for Jewish juridical autonomy and requested the right ''to judge and to be judged amongst themselves'' in any disputes between two Jews. 76 In one 1744 petition from the rabbis of Metz to the king, the supplicants explained that only through the privilege of civil jurisdiction could societal peace be maintained. Civil law, they affirmed, was as important as ritual law, and thus the ability to adju- dicate civil cases was ''an absolute necessity for the maintenance of their police [administration] , customs, and religious ceremonies, and even for that which concerns the administration in order to collect the payment of taxes. '' 77 Presumably, this was the exact kind of case that the parlement would have made for its jurisdiction. Moreover, the leaders understood the monarch's concern with orderly tax collection and intimated that this process would be put in jeopardy should Jewish officials cease to secure control over it. In other words, not only was Jewish jurisdiction essential for the Jews but it was also necessary for the program of the absolutist state.
In 1745, jurisdictional tensions between the parlement and the syndics resulted in a lawsuit brought before the king. In the affidavit which it delivered to the king, the parlement contended that the historical premise on which the Jewish community based its jurisdiction-beginning with the lettres patentes delivered by Henri IV in 1603-was of no consequence, as these events may have preceded the establishment of royal sovereignty over Metz. 78 The parlement thus presented the Jewish argument as one which challenged or undermined royal authority. In order to do so, however, it also acknowledged its own subordination to the rule of the monarch, using royal sovereignty as a counter to the Jewish position.
The parlement's memoire continued by explaining the impetus for the recueil, citing the need to ''give a regular form to the space of jurisdiction which the rabbis and elected judges use amongst themselves.'' It then took a distinctive turn in tone, expressing pity for the Jews. ''This people has rejected Jesus Christ,'' the memoire stated, ''has lost its country, its
CAHJP F Me 261, Petition des rabbins de Metz au sujet du recueil des leurs lois.
Written for secular authorities, many-if not all-of the letters and supplications to the parlement and the crown were composed in French. This document, however, bears a title in Yiddish, one that may lend us insight into the situation of the Jews during these years. In Yiddish, the title reads, '''Iske recueil odot d''y mishnat 1743'' (regarding the recueil from the year 1743). Recueil, curiously, is spelled in Yiddish according to the French spelling, not simply phonetically. Even in the Yiddish, the author chose to use the word recueil instead of an equivalent Hebrew or Yiddish word for ''compendium,'' perhaps indicating a certain level of integration into French culture and language, or a familiarity with French legal terminology that did not exist with similar Hebrew terms. See the introduction to Berkovitz, Protocols of Justice, which discusses at length the use of temple, and its priesthood, its state and its royalty, but the Nation remains dispersed, people and religion at once.'' Scattered in numerous different countries, the Jews were ''neither master nor independent in any of them.'' Requiring the Jews to adjudicate among themselves according to their own customs would be, according to the parlement, to reduce them to a separate status, one that would take them outside of the authority of the state. On the contrary, codification of their laws-a process that should take place in any province or royal territory-would give the Jews a ''degree of establishment'' and treat them as an integral part of the state. The Metz parlement thereby turned the Jewish argument on its head: the purpose of codifying Jewish law was not, as the Jews had assumed, to take their judicial powers away from them, leaving the community with little to no autonomy; rather, the process of organizing and categorizing Jewish law through a compendium would treat the Jews as full-fledged members of the French state, confirming upon them a status which other state establishments had previously denied them.
The affidavit delivered in response by the leaders of the Jewish community differed markedly in its approach. Like other supplicatory documents, the memoire of the syndics emphasized the ultimate importance of civil jurisdiction within the Jewish nation. Composed by Monsieur de Serionne, the lawyer for the Metz syndics and élus (elected officials), the memoire explained that the order and tranquility of the nation depended upon the exercise of their long-held jurisdiction. 79 This privilege of jurisdiction, they claimed, was authorized in all Christian states. Again, they emphasized the divine source of Jewish jurisprudence, quoting in Latin directly from Exodus in order to draw a parallel between the ancient judges of Israel and the contemporary rabbinic and lay leaders of Metz. Eliminating the right of jurisdiction, the leaders informed secular authorities, would not only shake the foundations of their religion but would infringe upon their right to practice religion freely. In an article on the codification of French customs, John P. Dawson remarked, ''Even in areas as to which tradition had crystallized, the necessity for verbal formulation must have impelled a new precision of thought and given sharper contours to the experience expressed, often in colloquial language, by the early texts. '' 81 The same can be said of the Recueil des lois, coutumes, et usages codified following the request of the parlement of Metz. Though Jewish law had been practiced and transmitted orally for generations, the new era of codification required a newly systematic arrangement and presentation, in which the legal compendium served as reference material for any cases presented to the parlement or disputes between the parlement and the Jewish leaders. There was now a formal body of scholarship to consult, which would necessarily alter the legal experience of Jews both within their own community as well as in the secular courts which they attended. In short, Jewish law was no longer exclusively ''Jewish.'' It had become an instrument of the French state. This led Jewish leaders to approach the law differently, catering more frequently to the parlement's understanding of it than to the community's internal comprehension of Jewish law.
The parlement of Metz was not the only governmental body to demand a translated book of law from its Jewish inhabitants, but it was perhaps the first. Later in the century, in 1770, the Prussian government asked Hirschel Lewin, rabbi of Berlin, to produce a compendium along with the philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, and after years of delay, they published Die Ritualgesetze der Juden in 1778. 82 In Moravia, too, the imperial government requested a translation of Jewish protocols during the mid-81. Dawson, ''The Codification of the French Customs,'' 781. (Berkeley, Calif., 1996) , 105. While some of the delay was due to circumstantial factors, it had another cause: the rabbi of Berlin wanted to maintain his consultative role for as long as possible, while the Prussian courts, in using the compendium, intended to rule without rabbinic consultation. Though Mendelssohn supported the Jewish use of secular courts, he felt that it would be impossible for Prussian courts to use an abbreviated handbook to judge Jews according to Jewish law and preferred, instead, that courts make use of secular law to adjudicate cases involving Jews, just as they would in any other case. Understanding Jewish law properly, he explained, required the consultation of the Talmud as well as additional legal sources. Upon submitting their handbook, Lewin and Mendelssohn defended the role of the Jewish courts, explaining that Prussian judges would not be able to render judgment on the basis of this compendium. eighteenth century. 83 Nonetheless, the recueil produced in Metz was, it seems, the first of its kind. As such, an analysis of what occurred in the wake of the translation lends insight into the shifting legal and social norms under which the community operated.
David Sorkin, Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment
Though it is not the aim of this essay to analyze the contents of the ''translation'' in depth, there are certainly elements of the recueil that merit discussion. Drawing on the sections of the Shulh . an 'arukh that deal with civil law and marriage and divorce contracts, the syndics, in their introduction, explained that the recueil contained sections concerning ''marriage contracts, guardians and trustees, majors [and minors] with regard to inheritances, wills, and other civil matters. '' 84 Though it purported to include a representative condensation of the laws of courts and adjudication, there was one seemingly glaring omission. In detailing who qualified as an appropriate judge for Jewish cases, the recueil, like the Hebrew Shulh . an 'arukh, recorded that ''judges cannot be parents or related to one another, nor to the parties involved . . . there cannot be any enmity between them, and if there is, they [the defendants] cannot be judged in fear that the desire to contradict oneself not prevail over the law. '' 85 Information concerning the fact that non-Jews were among those not allowed to serve as witnesses was conspicuously left out of the recueil. Stricken from the record was the line stating, ''It is forbidden to litigate before non-Jewish judges or in their courts, even if they rule in accordance with Jewish law, and even if both litigants have agreed to litigate before them. '' 86 Jewish leaders likely did not want the parlement to know that embedded in their corpus of law was a ruling that prohibited participation in the French civil court system, even when the governing parties exerted considerable effort to adhere to Jewish customs, as the parlement had.
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Furthermore, within the translation itself, as in the supplications written directly to the parlement and the king, were subtle intimations that only those knowledgeable in Jewish law would be able to decipher cases and deliver appropriate rulings. In one section, the translation instructed 83. Israel Heilperin, Takanot medinat Mehren (Jerusalem, 1952) that in order to assess the validity of the situation, ''it is necessary to recall the Hebrew texts regarding the situation.'' This assertion continued: ''It is all dependent on different words, letters, punctuations, or accents in the Hebrew-these cannot be expressed in French. Science, experience, and prudence of the judge are the sole [factors] which will facilitate a just decision in this case. '' 88 Even in the core of the translation itself, the leaders of the Jewish community could not resist the opportunity to inform parliamentary readers of their inability to deal with such matters. This assertion appeared in a section of the recueil dedicated to the laws of estates and inheritances, indicating that it would only have been possible for a qualified, Hebrewproficient authority to judge such a case fairly. In the following article, which concerned the trusteeship of a minor's possessions, the authors of the translation again maintained:
As in the preceding article, it is necessary to return to the Hebrew terms, and to the manner in which the disposition is conceived, in order to assess whether she [the mother] carries the status of heir, or is simply a guardian. This cannot be determined except through an exact and scrupulous examination by the judge of the Hebrew act which contains the disposition.
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Once more, the writers stressed the importance of consulting the original Hebrew document before ruling. Only a Jewish judge would be capable of executing such a task. The translation, in sum, was carefully crafted, not only fulfilling a legal function but also constituting a justification for the continued existence of rabbinic and lay Jewish judges.
REFORMING AND REFINING THE RECUEIL
The Metz parlement found the translation to be cumbersome, ''filled with propositions which corresponded neither to the gravity nor the proper administration of justice. '' 90 Aside from this, it was repetitive and selfcontradictory, which would prevent this version of the recueil from receiving the legal approbation of secular authorities. In a letter dated May 10, 1744, Monsieur de Montholon thus decided that an abridgement of the already abridged recueil was in order, so that Jewish law and ritual could finally be codified and used by the parlement to adjudicate in contestations 88 between Jews. Montholon concluded his letter by saying that it was up to the king to decide whether the new, edited version of the translation was ''de votre gout''-to his taste-and could thus be given force of law by the king.
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Aside from sporadic mentions, there are few documents that yield information regarding the recueil between 1745 and 1758/9. During this period, it is unclear exactly how Jewish communal autonomy shifted, though it is evident that the parlement inserted itself more forcefully into Jewish communal life. In a document dated 1754, for example, the parlement-not the syndics-assumed responsibility for the collection of taxes from a member of the Jewish community who had neglected to pay his annual fees to the community. 92 Whether the recueil was used in any formal sense during these years, though, remains uncertain.
Yet by 1758, the recueil had resurfaced. While some scholars have maintained that the community wished to distance itself from the recueil after its production, it appears from numerous legal manuscripts that both the parlement and the Jewish community referred to it in court cases. 93 Moreover, parliamentary officials began to ascribe authoritative status to the translation. When a Jewish man from Alsace approached the Metz parlement with a question about finding a guardian for an orphaned minor, the syndics and the parlement both accused the individuals who wished to become the guardians of trying to slow the decision process in order to benefit economically from the inheritance of the orphan. The syndics cited the Recueil des lois, explaining that the legal code did not allow for the ruling that the potential guardians believed to be correct. Furthermore, the parlement stated that the Recueil des lois was the definitive book of Jewish law, though the prospective guardians tried to explain that these laws were compiled in many different works.
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In a letter from the chancelier de France to the procureur of the parlement of Metz, the chancelier attested to the legitimacy of the recueil, stating: The syndics of the Jewish community of Metz have requested lettres patentes ordering that the translated collection of their ancient laws, which was deposited in the registry of the parlement of Metz, be utilized according to its form and content and all its provisions. This request is the continuation and the execution of the arret of the parlement from 3 July 1758, presented upon your indictment, which orders that in the term of one year, the syndics will be required to obtain lettres patentes confirming these laws and customs and justifying their diligence [in the production of the translation].
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The chancelier continued by explaining that the translation merited the utmost consideration, as it might authorize Jewish precepts that stood in contradiction to the laws of the monarchy. Evidently, the recueil had become an authoritative document in the eyes of the parlement, one in whose credibility it trusted when confronted with judicial rulings involving Jews. The monarch, too, legitimated the document, stating that Jews who brought their disputes to the parlement would be treated as favorably as they had previously been in Jewish courts.
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The translation remained at once a symbol of dwindling Jewish communal autonomy and an instrument of parliamentary and royal influence on Jewish affairs.
MARIANNE D'ALSACE AND THE INVOCATION OF THE RECUEIL
The elevation of the recueil to the status of a respected official document is perhaps most apparent in the documents concerning a certain Marianne d'Alsace, whose case was presented to the Metz parlement in early 1758. 98. Halphen's name is sometimes written as ''Alphen,'' and Maye's name is frequently written without an ''e'' at the end. I do not know which version is accurate. These two last names were very common in Metz, leading me to believe that Halphen, Maye, and Marianne d'Alsace were all from Metz. D'Alsace was likely an acquired name and did not mean that Marianne was from Metz. See to collect the inheritance that her guardians would otherwise be entrusted to administer. Halphen and Maye contested Marianne's claim on Jewish legal grounds, stating that Marianne, who was twelve years old, could not take control of her own funds. According to the original Hebrew laws of the Jewish community, they explained, thirteen and twelve were the respective ages at which males and females entered puberty, but not the ages at which they would be considered adults able to manage their own property if there existed guardians who could do so in their stead. 99 Halphen and Maye asserted that the recueil which the syndics and the parlement used had been translated incorrectly, and that it was necessary to refer to the original Hebrew text to verify that the translation conformed to the original.
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The syndics, however, refused to provide the original Hebrew document for verification and called into question Halphen's and Maye's qualifications to serve as guardians for the children of Moyse d'Alsace, given their personal interest in delaying a decision in order to prolong their authority over the minor children. Halphen and Maye objected, ''in order to ascribe a pretext to their refusal to communicate the original Hebrew of their laws and customs, they [the syndics] dare to assume that these laws and customs had been compiled in many different works, while in actuality there is only one compendium for all synagogues, for all Jews in all countries and spread across the entire earth. '' 101 The fact that Halphen and Maye had to challenge the 1742/3 translation in order to uphold their claim that Marianne was still a minor in the eyes of Jewish law illustrates the status of the recueil as a legitimate legal source. Furthermore, in their allegation that local compilations of Jewish law were invalid, and that there existed one code for all Jewish communities, Halphen and Maye devalued the position of the recueil and uplifted the status of the ''one compendium''-the Shulh . an 'arukh written by Joseph Karo-to a legal code that applied to the entire Jewish world.
The syndics, by contrast, had maintained the authority of the recueil by refusing to provide the original Hebrew document. This perhaps represented another attempt by the leaders of the Jewish community to assert the need for educated Jewish law experts to adjudicate in such cases. The very fact that two community members could challenge the recueil Pierre-André Meyer, Tables du register d'état civil de la communauté juive de Metz, 1717 -1792 (Paris, 1987 and question its accuracy and faithfulness to the original served as the syndics' evidence to the parlement of the necessary role which Jewish judges played in interpreting the complex code of Jewish law. Without judges who could easily refer to the original Hebrew document to validate the translation, cases would be subject to appeals to other legal authorities. At the same time, their refusal to present a copy of the original Hebrew text to the parlement constituted an assertion of the authority of the recueil itself, implying that it was unnecessary for the parlement to refer to the original Hebrew given the comprehensive nature of the translation. The defendants contended that the syndics' refusal to provide the original Hebrew source was based on the desire of one of the syndics, Nehemie Recher (Nehemiah Reischer), to marry his son to Marianne d'Alsace. According to this logic, Recher would have wanted Marianne to be considered an adult so that she could become engaged to and then wed his son. He and the syndics therefore prolonged the verification of the translation in order to facilitate this union. If the parlement were to cross-check chapter 12, articles 1-2 of the translation with section 235, articles 1-2 of the original, Halphen and Maye insisted, the court would be convinced that ''the translator who did the work was not faithful [to the original]. '' 102 In actuality, Halphen and Maye had grounds on which to stand. While the recueil presented an abbreviated version of section 235 (of the Shulh . an 'arukh), it omitted details that were important to Halphen and Maye's claim of guardianship. The translation, for example, recorded the laws concerning minors as follows:
Article 1: All minors who are placed under the authority of a guardian cannot conduct business, whether for movables or fixed property, and guardianship lasts until the age of thirteen for males, and twelve for females.
Article 2: Males can nevertheless be emancipated at the age of ten and placed outside of guardianship if they seem intelligent enough to govern their own affairs, and thus they can sell and have their movables and household effects at their discretion.
The Shulh . an 'arukh itself, however, honored the rights of an emancipated minor only with regard to movables. With regard to fixed property, the text stated that a minor could not buy or sell until he reached adulthood. Moreover, the Shulh . an 'arukh stated explicitly that these rules of transactions ''refer to a minor who has no guardian. A minor who does have a 102. Ibid. guardian, though, cannot make transactions even with regards to movables unless the guardian approves. '' 103 Thus Halphen and Maye were technically in the right, lending more credence to their claim that the syndics were merely trying to forestall the presentation of the original Hebrew text because of the fallacies that such a comparison would reveal.
According to a record from after 1759, it appears that the recueil was eventually confirmed on the side of the syndics. Halphen and Maye were accused of stirring up trouble in order to prolong their control over Marianne d'Alsace's property. 104 A letter written by one of the syndics to Monsieur Adrian in Paris-presumably an assistant to the chancelier-on May 14, 1759, explained that the recueil had been consulted and approved within the community, but that upon his return, the rabbi, Moshe Bellin, would consult the chancelier directly to receive official royal confirmation.
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Regardless of the outcome, it is notable that Halphen and Maye turned to the parlement to prove the syndics wrong in a question of Jewish law. While we saw this previously in the cases of Merlé Spir Lévi and Magdeleine Cahen, the existence of a reference book of Jewish law altered the nature of the legal struggle. The defendants now had a document on which to base their claims, making it more difficult for the syndics to dispute their allegations. Challenges had to be more precisely worded and formulated, as they relied on written French sources as proof rather than mere summaries of documents written in a foreign language. More than this, the parlement and the king together had become the arbiters of Jewish law and the mediators of Jewish practice. The syndics' words were no longer taken at face value but had to be reviewed and confirmed by the parlement and then by royal officials. The documentation of Jewish law thus necessitated a fundamental shift in the structure of Jewish communal autonomy, one in which the requests of secular authorities fused with internal communal strife to produce a more fragmented organization of Jewish juridical power. sumed, a bipolar division between the royal and municipal authorities and the Jewish community of Metz. Jews were savvy with regard to French civil courts and indeed had to be in order to conduct business successfully and garner favorable rulings. Even early in the eighteenth century, leaders of the Jewish community of Metz understood the value of harmonious relations with both the parlement and the monarch. But when necessary, they did not hesitate to pit one authority against the other to achieve the outcome that would protect their communal jurisdiction. The parlement, in turn, used control over the Jewish community as a way of asserting its own authority. Ultimately, however, sovereign power rested with the king. Both the Jewish community and the parlement recognized this fact and both called on the king's support to bolster their respective claims to autonomy. Within the Jewish community itself, dissatisfaction with the fairness and effectiveness of courts contributed to a desire to move beyond the bounds of communal jurisdiction in search of more just rulings.
The complex relationship between the monarch, the parlement, and the Jewish community illustrates the uneasy path toward legal and social integration that occurred in Metz. While conventional histories have posited that unlike the experience of other Jewish communities, integration in France came in a single blow struck by the French Revolution, we would do better to view the Revolution as one step in a much lengthier process. The translation of Jewish law into French in the 1740s was certainly a critical chapter in this process, one which made Jewish tradition available to parliamentary authorities and thereby paved the way for the legal coexistence of later decades.
Though during the 1740s and 1750s the rabbis and syndics of Metz endeavored to preserve and protect their juridical authority, by the 1770s, the Metz bet din understood the limits of its jurisdiction. In particular cases the bet din admitted its uncertainty as to how to rule and encouraged litigants to seek the opinion of French legal experts. Acknowledging the place of French civil law, the bet din respected the procedures of the French civil court system while maintaining its own processes and practices, producing in practice a kind of legal pluralism in which the bet din coordinated with the corresponding French civil courts.
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The process of codification, of fine-tuning Jewish law to make it palatable to non-Jewish authorities, altered the practice and hence our picture of communal autonomy in Metz. As the relationship between the parlement and the king shifted, so too did relationships between individuals in 106. Berkovitz, Protocols of Justice.
the Jewish community. Once the parlement obtained a compendium of Jewish law, it became impossible for communal leaders to maintain the same degree of autonomy that they had previously enjoyed and exercised. Though the syndics attempted to set the competing sovereignties of the parlement and the king in opposition to each other in order to reinforce Jewish autonomy, a certain degree of legal coexistence proved unavoidable. As the Jews of Metz became part of the larger French legal community, so too the parlement and the king became a greater part of theirs.
